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Abstract 
“Look at the Bigger Picture”: An Analysis of Netflix’s Business Model and Strategy 
From CEO Reed Hastings’ Long-Term View 
Amanda Ramsaran 
 This thesis is more of a case study, aiming to explore the potential impact of 
Netflix’ business model and strategy on the traditional television and film ecosystem. It is 
a forward-looking examination, derived from CEO Reed Hastings’ Long-Term View for 
Netflix as declared through the company’s Investor Relations website in February 2014. 
This outlook was presented the same time the company’s 10-K was filed for Fiscal Year 
[FY] 2013 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 Reed Hastings’ Long-Term View for Netflix is written like a manifesto, declaring 
the revolutionary power that the company holds with regards to the television and film 
industry, primarily as a distributor of content. Netflix’s power lies within its proprietary 
system and application technology that offers its subscribers suggestions and 
recommendations on what next to watch based on their viewing preferences and history. 
This collection of data has allowed Netflix to make decisions on content licensing and 
acquisition and, within the last few years, investment in original content. The Internet TV 
network’s platform is available to subscribers for a no-commitment low monthly fee. 
Content is widely accessible, from any Internet connection and across a multitude of 
devices, from smartphones to large-format Smart TVs. 
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 Hastings declares that “the linear TV channel model is ripe for replacement” 
because of new time-shifting capabilities and technological advancements, including 
Netflix’s own, that have given audiences advanced screen proliferation, and new choices 
in how they consume television and film, primarily through the Internet. This case study 
aims to present the ways in which Netflix is challenging that linear television model and 
theatrical film release model alike through their business model and strategy, as outlined 
particularly in the company’s long-term view, outlook in their financial documents to 
investors, and releases about future endeavors. 
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Introduction 
 “Studios and networks who ignore either shift - whether the increasing 
sophistication of storytelling, or the constantly shifting sands of technological 
advancement - will be left behind. And if they fail to hear these warnings, audiences will 
evolve faster than they will. They will seek the stories and content providers who give 
them what they demand… Netflix and other similar services have succeeded because 
they have married good content with a forward-thinking approach to viewing habits and 
appetites” (Spacey). 

 The revolution will not be televised. Rather, it will be available for unlimited, on-
demand streaming through an Internet TV network across a multitude of devices for a 
commitment-free monthly fee. This is happening through Netflix, Inc. and the television 
and film ecosystems, from pre-production to distribution, are beginning to understand the 
company’s power as it champions for its rapidly-increasing membership domestically and 
internationally. The Los Gatos, California-based company possesses the first-mover 
advantage as “the world’s leading Internet television network with more than 50 million 
streaming members in over 40 countries enjoying more than one billion hours of TV 
shows and movies per month, including original series” (Netflix, Inc. 2014). 

 Upon Netflix releasing its financial data to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] for Fiscal Year 2013 [FY 2013] at the beginning of 2014, CEO Reed 
Hastings also took to the company’s Investor Relations page with an outlook of his own. 
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He shared a manifesto titled “Netflix Long-Term View” and is an outline of his prospects 
for the company.  

 The document is a broad look at what Hastings sees for Netflix, as a framework of 
the vision, mission statement, and values that the company has adopted and operated on 
since defining its core competence as an “increasingly global Internet TV 
network” (Hastings, April 2014).  

 It starts out declaring to be a model for the future as audiences turn to Internet TV 
after their disappointments with the linear TV experience. There is still a bit of chaos as 
those linear TV outlets have started to offer applications [“apps”] on Internet-based 
platforms as a slight transition to the Internet TV model and confusion among audiences 
trying to access it and still required to have a linear TV service, either via a cable or 
satellite provider. Netflix aims to be the activity of choice for its members who are fed up 
with such complications and underwhelmed by the lack of freedom, choice, and 
availability of programming from their traditional television service. Its proprietary 
platform of determining viewer habits and offering suggestions of what members will 
enjoy is a far more intelligent system for audiences over mindlessly waiting for television 
seasons to come and go with executives determining what stays and what goes based on 
seemingly archaic Nielsen ratings and performance. Furthermore, Netflix curates its 
library with the most relevant titles. The company’s ventures into producing original 
content has been a vastly successful, adding value to the Netflix brand and also providing 
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a revolutionary economic model by committing to full seasons rather than order pilots 
and subsequently testing them. Also contributing to the growth of the Netflix brand are its 
endeavors in international expansion since 2010. The company has also identified its 
place in the market relative to its competition and highlights Time Warner’s premium 
cable network HBO as its “biggest long-term competitor-for-content” (Hastings, April 
2014). On another front, Netflix covers the complicated relationship it has been having 
with some Internet service providers [ISPs] domestically, and is actively championing for 
net neutrality to prevail from the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] in a future 
ruling in order to best serve its members, as well as seeking to block a merger between 
Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc., two cable Internet providers whose 
relationship with Netflix has become complicated in their interconnectivity infrastructure. 
Financially, the company highlights its margin structure and growth coming primarily out 
of revenue from the domestic sector and using it to fund international expansion and 
content acquisition. Membership growth is immediately tied to revenue potential and how 
expenditures are influenced as the primary measure of Netflix’s success. 

 Once Mr. Hastings has closed out the document, there is a disclosure that the 
“forward-looking statements…are subject to risks and uncertainties” that are outlined in 
detail in Netflix’s Annual Report within Form 10-K filed with the SEC on February 3, 
2014 for  FY 2013 (Hastings, April 2014). Furthermore, Netflix sees “no obligation to 
update forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the 
date of this document” (Hastings, April 2014). Despite this notice, Netflix is at the 
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forefront of a revolution in the distribution of television and film content via the Internet 
to its members. In addition to outlining what is in store for the company in the future, 
Hastings offers insight on what he sees for the industry as an Internet TV network and the 
technological landscape surrounding it. It is the definition of a model and strategy that is 
embraced and challenged by everyone from independent content creators to major 
entertainment conglomerates.  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Literature Review 
 Netflix’s Long-Term View, as written by CEO Reed Hastings on the company’s 
Investor Relations website will serve as the primary source and offer the framework of 
this thesis. The document aims to present the ways in which “Netflix is leading the way 
around the world” as an Internet television network (Hastings, April 2014). 

 On the topic of Netflix’s forward-looking statements and strategies, financial data 
and statements on the nature of the business coming directly from the company itself 
have been used as primary sources. The most recent data was released on July 21, 2014 
for Q2 2014, and includes their letter to shareholders and an edited transcript of their 
earnings call with Thomson Reuters. Prior to this, data for Q1 2014 was made available 
on April 21, 2014. The most recent complete financial data set is Netflix’s Form 10-K 
filed with the SEC on February 3, 2014 for FY 2013, also used as a source for this thesis. 
These documents not only contain facts and figures of the company’s financial 
performance, but also outline the nature of the business, its organization structure, some 
strategic insight, and risk factors in the operation of the business. 

 Netflix is very tight-lipped about its internal workings, especially regarding its 
collection of “big data” on subscribers’ viewing habits and personalization preferences. 
The company does not provide much insight on its metrics other than to plainly say what 
is working and what isn’t. Literature that does exist on the subject is either speculative or 
originates from Netflix’s press releases. There are a few exceptions; for example, the 
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Associated Press was invited to the company’s headquarters for the launch of the first 
season of Orange is the New Black to observe the technical aspects of the process 
(Liedtke, 2013). 

 While Netflix itself keeps its proprietary information to itself, CEO Reed 
Hastings, CFO David Wells, and Chief Content Officer Ted Sarandos are not entirely 
elusive. All three key personnel have contributed to not only matters involving investor 
relations and press releases directly from the company; they have made appearances in 
everything from print media to cable news in order to put a human face to the 
recommendation and personalization engine that determines what its subscribers want 
next. Netflix’s company blog is perhaps the most pro-consumer link to current and future 
subscribers; it primarily features posts from its communications and technology teams on 
what’s new and available for the service but on occasion even Hastings has contributed. 
In March 2014, he wrote about the importance of “strong net neutrality” to the service 
and how subscribers can help take action in understanding how it works and making 
appeals to the Federal Communications Commission and their respective Internet service 
providers on better access (Hastings, March 2014). Wells leads the investor calls on 
Netflix’s side every quarter and they have been made available to the public on YouTube. 
Meanwhile, Sarandos spoke about fighting a convention of traditional television, 
“waiting”, to CNN’s Brian Stelter on the heels of the release of season 2 of Orange is the 
New Black (2014). Some of Netflix’s engineers have shed some light on their inner 
workings without being too transparent; Engineering Director Xavier Amatriain and Vice 
!7
President of Product Innovation, Personalization Algorithms Carlos Gomez-Uribe shared 
with Wired magazine how the algorithms and technology that power Netflix’s platform 
work (Vanderbilt, 2014). Just outside of Netflix’s immediate camp is Kevin Spacey, who 
plays Senator Francis Underwood in House of Cards, Netflix’s first domestic venture into 
original programming. He spoke at the Edinburgh Television Festival, not only as an 
actor, but as a producer of the series, and the differences in being involved with a 
business model so far removed from the industry norm: “Frankly… I wouldn’t have been 
up here lecturing you because my agent would have never even allowed me to even 
consider being on a television series after winning an Oscar, much less something 
‘streaming’” (Spacey). The literature available between all those involved in and out of 
Netflix’s operations is very positive, forward-thinking, and maintains an air of confidence 
regarding the success of the service. Despite keeping the actual data and other proprietary 
information to itself, the company presents itself candidly, especially to its subscribers, to 
further explore their relationship with the network. 

 Other literature that exists on giving forward-looking insight into Netflix’s 
business model and strategy includes company history and background, interviews with 
key personnel, and some academic research. Ken Auletta of The New Yorker wrote a 
cover story on the company’s history and the direction where it is headed, relative to 
other prospects in the film and television industry (2014). Tim Wu of Columbia Law 
School wrote in New Republic of the bold new direction Netflix is headed into as it began 
to self-identity as a “network”, as opposed to “new media venture” or “tech 
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startup” (2013). Although members of Netflix’s technology and engineering camps have 
gone on record to talk about how the service works, there are some speculative reports on 
how it all comes together. Alexis Madrigal of The Atlantic mapped out all 76,897 
microgenres within its personalization engine, interviewed Vice President of Product 
Innovation Todd Yellin to match how close he came, and spoke of the potential that the 
engine has in further determining original programming decisions (2014). SNL Kagan’s 
research has focused more on finance, marketing, and valuations of Netflix’s endeavors. 
The source has covered their prospects for the company in their most recent Economics of 
Mobile Programming, Media Trends, and State of Online Video Delivery publications. In 
addition to analyzing the market relative to Netflix as first-mover, there are projections 
made with regard to the state of over-the-top [OTT] subscriber activity trajectories 
relative to multichannel video program distributors, cable and satellite alike (SNL Kagan, 
December 2013). 

 This thesis aims to cover all of the forward-looking prospects for Netflix for their 
business model and strategy as outlined in Hastings’ Long-Term View and put them into 
perspective through analysis of financial data, subscriber data relative to its “biggest 
long-term competitor-for-content” HBO (Hastings, April 2014), statements made by key 
personnel involved either directly or in cooperation with the company, and research 
completed by third-parties. While Netflix is known for keeping its proprietary data to 
itself, this thesis aims to add a dimension of transparency to the company's operations and 
present the ways it will secure its success as it proceeds to revolutionize the way people 
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experience receiving television and film content for their entertainment at any time and 
any place, on [almost] any device.  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Methodology 
 Derived from prospects that Reed Hastings outlined in Netflix’s Long-Term View, 
data was collected primarily through Netflix’s financial and subscriber releases. The 
company is very tight-lipped about other data and only makes it available internally. 
Specifics related to their service’s performance and success measures are inaccessible. 
That data that was obtained successfully was then converted into timeline-based charts, 
graphs, and tables throughout this document to add context to Hastings’ forward-looking 
statements. Historical data for Netflix was taken from the company’s financial 
statements, available on their Investor Relations site, starting with FY 2007 [the first year 
the company began their streaming service over the Internet (Auletta)] through FY 2013. 

 With regard to the projections for Netflix’s domestic subscriber growth for 2014 
and beyond, the source data is inaccessible externally. A forecasting model was applied 
for the number of domestic year-end subscribers from 2014 to 2018 and percentage 
growth rate of domestic subscribers from 2014 to 2018. It was converted into a timeline 
graph and compared against HBO’s projections for domestic year-end subscribers and 
percentage growth/decline of domestic subscribers, as predicted by SNL Kagan. The 
calculations for Netflix are included in the Appendix to this thesis. 

 Data from HBO, which Netflix considers its “biggest long-term competitor-for-
content” HBO (Hastings, April 2014), was taken from SNL Kagan’s dataset: total number 
of domestic subscribers and domestic subscriber percentage growth/loss rate. Historical 
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data is included for FY 1995 [the earliest year data is available] to FY 2013. These 
numbers were also translated to a timeline-based bar graph and compared against 
Netflix’s historical data from FY 2007 to FY 2013.  

 Table B is a listing of series that the company has lined up as “Netflix Originals” 
for the coming year and beyond. Renewed series House of Cards and Orange is the New 
Black have been included as they are distinguished as “Netflix brand advertising” as 
flagship series for the “Originals” brand. These originals are “in production” and were 
outlined in the Q2 Letter to Shareholders (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). Additional insight on 
production details was gathered from their respective Internet Movie Database [IMDb] 
pages. 

 Figure 4 features a map of all the regions that Netflix has expanded to 
internationally. The company does not have an official listing of the availability of its 
international streaming service; however, one was compiled from Andrew Wallenstein’s 
coverage on European expansion in Variety (2014). Regions where service is available 
are in varying shades of red and increasingly into purple for later markets. Regions in 
blue are prospects for the company within the next year or two. 

 The methodology is timeline-based and derives primarily from Netflix’s historical 
figures and company releases; however, it provides insight into futures, prospects, and 
opportunities where the data is kept proprietary for the company alone to analyze and 
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further expand their service. Relative to the already-existing data for HBO, actuals and 
projections alike, there is a seemingly unstoppable trajectory of success for Netflix’s 
business model and strategy, namely with their first-mover advantage as “the world’s 
leading Internet television network” (Netflix, Inc. 2014).  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“Linear TV is popular but ripe for replacement” 
 Despite the popularity of linear TV, users are becoming more and more frustrated 
with the navigation and complexity of the medium. It is time-restrictive, it cannot adapt 
to all screens without the additional installation and learning curve that comes with 
ported apps, and its economics always have to account for price increases for 
infrastructure, additional features, and other upgrades over time. 

 “Netflix’s gambit…is to replace the traditional TV model with one dictated by the 
behaviors and values of the Internet generation. Instead of feeding a collective identity 
with broadly appealing content, the streamers imagine a culture united by shared tastes 
rather than arbitrary time slots” (Wu). Deciding what to watch on television has long 
been determined by a programming grid, the availability of shows and movies within 
each network’s respective schedule. Major cable and satellite television providers have 
tried to reinvent their subscription models, endeavors of which include TV Everywhere, a 
model to give their subscribers access to their respective networks’ live and on-demand 
content over the Internet. This authentication requirement is to hinder “cable cutting” 
efforts, growing in popularity as disgruntled cable and satellite subscribers turn to 
canceling their service and replacing it with combinations of over-the-air [OTA] 
broadcast channels, over-the-top [OTT] services like Netflix, rentals and purchases of 
online video, and piracy (Hastings, April 2014).  
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 SNL Kagan’s research has identified three major scenarios, with data current as of 
September 2013, with regard to the future of OTT substitutes relative to the traditional 
cable/satellite multichannel package. Their forecasts present the ends of the spectrum for 
both markets as they see change over the next several years (SNL Kagan, December 
2013). 
 
Figure 1: SNL Kagan Media Trends, Disintermediation Scenario (December 2013) 
• The first presents OTT substitutes as a mass disruption to the cable/satellite 
multichannel ecosystem. Changes leading to this forecast include “consumer 
dissatisfaction with the current offerings as well as signs of wear around the service 
provider and content owner relationship” (SNL Kagan, December 2013). For Netflix, 
this would mean consumers are seeing services like it more as a substitute for their 
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multichannel cable or satellite subscription and would turn to “cord-cutting” rather than 
continue to be dissatisfied. 
 
Figure 2: SNL Kagan Media Trends, Return-to-Growth Scenario (December 2013) 
• The second scenario predicted for the cable/satellite multichannel market against OTT 
substitutes is a return-to-growth model. “The multichannel segment will be able to 
attract more customers to the big subscription package and content providers will work 
to further secure the dual-revenue stream with exclusivity” (SNL Kagan, December 
2013). The end result would be a rise in cable/satellite multichannel penetration and 
more reliable yearly subscriber growth. Netflix would potentially see the service 
peaking now, but within a year multichannel cable and satellite providers would be able 
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to turn around their service, for example, with better implementation and access to TV 
Everywhere for subscribers, leading to a drop in OTT substitutions. 
 
Figure 3: SNL Kagan Media Trends, OTT Substitution Forecast (December 2013) 
• The third forecast is marked by “the continued prevalence of the multichannel 
subscription, assuming it remains the avenue for the majority of U.S. households to 
access high-value content in the immediate release window, including sports and other 
live programming” (SNL Kagan, December 2013). The cable/satellite multichannel 
providers barely escape major declines in customer subscriptions but may miss further 
expansion opportunities due to growth in OTT substitutes’ content libraries, exclusive 
deals, and programming of originals. Under this forecast, Netflix and OTT services like 
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it would see gains but would be seen as complementary to multichannel cable and 
satellite service instead of a replacement. OTT services could instead potentially be 
seen as a replacement for premium cable channels, like HBO/Cinemax, Showtime, and 
Starz/Encore, as more network-specific content becomes the output. 

 “Clearly the success of the Netflix model…has proved one thing - the audience 
wants the control. They want freedom. If they want to binge…then we should let them 
binge… Give people what they want -  when they want it - in the form they want it in - at 
a reasonable price - and they’ll more likely pay for it rather than steal it… I believe this 
new model can take a bite out of piracy” (Spacey).  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“The evolution to Internet TV apps has begun” 
 Part of Netflix’s first-mover advantage is that it was always an Internet TV 
network from the time it introduced its streaming service in 2007. Now, broadcast and 
cable networks and cable and satellite TV providers are shifting into Internet TV. There is 
a conundrum with how the linear network expects to keep up when its respective Internet 
TV app is so much more accessible, such as the case with HBO and its HBOGO app. 
Another conflict occurs in the case between ESPN’s app, which provides real-time sports 
content and news, while it would need to keep up with Major League Baseball’s [MLB] 
app and its respective Internet TV content. 

 In the Long-Term View, Hastings outlines how “Internet TV is better than linear 
TV in ways consumers care about” and is positive that “it will grow to replace linear TV” 
(April 2014). He is also hopeful that an increasingly drastic shift will take place in the 
future, where “as linear TV is viewed less, the spectrum it now uses on cable, fiber, and 
over-the-air will be reallocated to expand Internet data transmission,” while satellite 
television subscribers will be fewer and in more rural locations (Hastings, April 2014). 

 Apart from its ISP relationships and overseeing regulation, Netflix recognizes that 
Internet is “getting faster, more reliable and more available,” making accessibility to 
Internet TV networks like itself that much more prevalent.  Technological advancements 
outside of what Netflix has developed for its own platform is helping to guide the 
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transition to a more Internet-based TV ecosystem that will come to rely on more internal 
data and tailored metrics, rather than program grids and Nielsen ratings.  

 “Connected devices are proliferating and broadband pipelines are growing, but 
both remain cogs in a machine that is ultimately subservient to content availability” and 
one estimate of “core video devices connected to the Internet in U.S. households” to 
reach 400 million at the end of 2013 (SNL Kagan, December 2013). Smart TVs with 
Internet connectivity via Wi-Fi are predicted to become the standard. For peripherals, 
Smart TV adapters like Google’s Chromecast and streaming media players like Apple TV 
are improving continuously much like the apps and software used within the respective 
device, highlight connectivity to Netflix in their product, and “as the category with the 
lowest price point, consumer entry into the market is easy and could have the most direct 
impact in the long-term” for this market (SNL Kagan, December 2013). Despite data caps 
from wireless providers, tablet and smartphone viewing is also increasing due to greater 
Wi-Fi connectivity on those devices. Including game consoles, Blu-Ray players, and 
home theatre systems, Netflix is available on about 800 different devices (Liedtke, 2013). 

 “Streaming is the leading source for 4K Ultra-HD video” and the conversion to 
this format is “being led by Internet video because Internet services can efficiently serve 
just the homes with 4K televisions, while linear would have to convert entire markets 
channel by channel” (Hastings, April 2014). Netflix offered the second season of House 
of Cards in 4K Ultra-HD format, plus the Breaking Bad series, and has committed to 
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offering future original programming in 4K, all for their same low monthly subscriber 
fee. 

 Netflix highlights TV Everywhere being the catalyst for the “economic transition 
to Internet TV… If a consumer continues to subscribe to linear TV from a multi-channel 
video program distributor [MVPD], they will get a password to use the Internet apps for 
the networks to which they subscribe on linear TV” (Hastings, April 2014). Additionally, 
there are some MVPD providers like DIRECTV, Xfinity, and Sky Go with their own 
multi-channel app; however, consumers prefer the network apps because they are more 
tailored to suit the user. Apart from linear networks, Internet TV has enabled services like 
YouTube, Hulu, and Amazon Prime “to build large-scale direct-to-consumer services that 
are independent of the existing MVPD bundle” (Hastings, April 2014). It has become a 
very clustered marketplace but Netflix maintains its high market share through its first-
mover advantage in the Internet TV space apart from the linear TV ecosystem that is 
finding ways to adapt now. Netflix is driving its own improvements and innovation, far 
ahead of the traditional system looking to keep up.  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“Netflix singular focus” 
 Netflix was founded in 1997 by now-CEO Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph of 
Pure Software, Hastings’ previous startup centered around a platform to find software 
bugs. Mathematician Neil Hunt, one of Hastings’ former colleagues, was the first recruit 
for the company, and he helped “create a ‘personalization’ engine that would decipher 
what each subscriber liked to watch, based on what the subscriber has watched before, 
and suggest what he or she might want to see next” (Auletta). This algorithm would serve 
as a blueprint for Netflix’s targeting platform in the years to follow. Two years later, Ted 
Sarandos from West Coast Video, a local chain that operated similarly to Blockbuster, 
was hired as Chief Content Officer, given his deep knowledge of movies and TV shows. 
He was delegated to “broaden the range of material that Netflix made 
available” (Auletta). 

 In 2002, Netflix went public and finally evolved into a profitable venture. 
Hastings was adamant about differentiating the service from other film and TV 
distribution outlets in shifting to streaming content over the Internet. This became quite a 
struggle since most of the major film and TV studios already had long-term deals in place 
with existing premium cable channels like HBO, Showtime, and Starz. In 2008, Starz 
made a deal with Netflix to stream the movies it had acquired. “Starz and other content 
providers realized that Netflix offered not only a new source of revenue but also a way to 
build audiences for current broadcast and cable shows, by allowing Netflix subscribers to 
watch prior seasons” (Auletta). Notably, AMC Networks’ most recent successes in 
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original programming including Mad Men, Breaking Bad, and The Walking Dead have 
seen major gains in ratings, progressively each season because of their full availability 
through an on-demand network such as Netflix. Meanwhile, other broadcast and cable 
networks reached licensing agreements for the company to air previous seasons of their 
respective series; however, broadcast giants ABC, NBC, and Fox made current seasons 
explicitly off-limits. This was reserved for their answer to Netflix, a subscription-based 
ad-supported Internet TV network called Hulu, launched in 2008. 

 In addition to expanding their content library, Netflix worked to make itself more 
widely available across a plethora of platforms: streaming devices like Apple TV and 
Roku, video game consoles, smartphones, tablets, Smart TVs, and more. The company 
also began rolling out internationally in 2010, starting with availability of the service in 
Canada. At the beginning of 2011, Netflix announced that it would be developing its own 
original programming, starting with two seasons of political thriller House of Cards, 
created by Oscar-nominated screenwriter Beau Willimon and adapted from a 1990 BBC 
miniseries based on a Michael Dobbs novel, executive produced by David Fincher, and 
starring Kevin Spacey. 

 Towards the end of 2011, Netflix made a grave misstep. The company spun off its 
DVD-by-mail rental service as Qwikster in September, splitting its subscription service 
apart from its growing streaming platform. Instead of charging subscribers $8 per month 
to be able to stream from its library and rent DVDs through the mail, it now cost them 
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$16. There was a mass exodus of 800,000 subscribers and the company’s stock price fell 
sharply. Within a month; however, Netflix reversed plans for Qwikster but maintained the 
separation of the streaming subscriptions and the DVD rental business. Of the strategic 
move, Hastings recognized that the number of rentals were dropping, and likened it to 
following the opposite of AOL, Kodak, and Blockbuster’s stubbornness and eventual 
failures in replacing and updating their flagship product or service: “We would say, 
‘Every business we could think of died because they were too cautious’” (Auletta).  

 After the Qwikster fallout, Netflix turned its attention to its original programming 
and gained some traction ahead of schedule at the beginning of 2012 with the acquisition 
of its first exclusive series, Lilyhammer starring Steve Van Zandt as an American Mafioso 
relocated by the FBI to Lillehammer, Norway. The show was originally produced for 
Norway’s NRK1 network but was postponed from its January 1, 2012 air date due to 
conflicts in product placement content that was illegal under Norwegian law during 
production (Bryne, 2012). It began streaming on Netflix on February 6, 2012. 

 A year later, House of Cards premiered on February 1, 2013 and Netflix made all 
13 episodes available at once. The first season was lauded with critical acclaim, receiving 
nine Emmy nominations and winning three later in the year: Outstanding Directing for a 
Drama Series [David Fincher, “Chapter 1”], Outstanding Casting for a Drama Series 
[Laray Mayfield, Julie Schubert], and Outstanding Cinematography for a Single-Camera 
Series [Eigil Bryld, “Chapter 1”], marking “the first time a non-traditional television 
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show had won the award” (Auletta). Netflix garnered 14 nominations in total for its 
original programming at the 65th Primetime Emmy Awards in 2013 (Netflix, Inc., July 
2014). Hemlock Grove, executive produced by Eli Roth, was the second Netflix Original 
to premiere in 2013, and all 13 episodes of its first season was made available on April 
19. Netflix’s first comedy Original was the revival of FOX’s Arrested Development, with 
15 episodes launching on May 26, 2013. “The most watched series in every Netflix 
territory” became comedy-drama Original from Weeds creator Jenji Kohan Orange is the 
New Black premiering on July 11, 2013 (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). The show’s first season 
was ineligible for nominations at the 65th Primetime Emmy Awards in 2013, but earned 
12 nominations at the 66th Primetime Emmy Awards in 2014, more than any other 
comedy series, and won three: Outstanding Guest Actress in a Comedy Series [Uzo 
Aduba], Outstanding Casting for a Comedy Series [Jennifer Euston], and Outstanding 
Single-Camera Picture Editing for a Comedy Series [William Turro, “Tit Punch”]. 
Additionally, for the 66th Primetime Emmy Awards, “Netflix original series and 
documentaries received 31 Emmy nominations,” more than double of the previous year 
(Netflix, Inc., July 2014). 2014 also saw Netflix becoming a film distributor, acquiring 
Jehane Noujaim’s The Square, a documentary on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution coming 
out of Tahrir Square, after screening at the 2013 Sundance Film Festival and 2013 
Toronto International Film Festival. The film, in addition to winning three awards out of 
four nominations at the 66th Primetime Emmy Awards, was nominated for the Academy 
Award for Best Documentary Feature at the 86th Academy Awards, presented by the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). 
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 Netflix self-identifies as “an increasingly global Internet TV network offering 
movies and TV shows commercial-free, with unlimited viewing on any Internet-
connected screen for an affordable no-commitment monthly fee…extensive exclusive 
content is key, as is the ability for members to have control over their viewing 
experience” (Hastings, April 2014). While its core competency would appear to be 
content delivery, it has expanded to offering strong original content as well, with creative 
direction guided from its recommendation algorithm and platform. "When we start taking 
creative risks - that is, reading a script and guessing if it was going to be a big hit and 
who might be good to cast in it - it’s not something that fundamentally as a tech company 
or a company run by a tech CEO like myself is likely to build a distinctive organizational 
competence in,” Hastings said in 2011, hesitant to acknowledge crossing over its core 
competency (Carr, 2013). 

 Netflix currently offers its service to domestic subscribers at $8.99 a month, 
following a $1 price increase [up from $7.99 per month] in May 2014. Existing members 
were extended a grandfathered pricing period, where they may enjoy the service at the 
same $7.99 rate for two years so long as they remain a subscriber. Members may use the 
service on up to two screens at a time, with high-definition content included. Netflix 
expects that average revenue per user to “rise slowly as member at the new prices grow 
as a percentage of total membership” and adds that there has been little to no effect on 
membership growth due to the price increase (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). 
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 In the Long-Term View, Hastings acknowledges a commitment of $500 million in 
marketing to attract people worldwide to Netflix (April 2014). The company has had a 
strong presence on social media, including from third parties just claiming to be fans of 
the service and its content. Hastings himself is no stranger to the world of social media 
and its interconnectedness with Netflix; he sits on the board of directors for Facebook and 
has integrated Facebook’s API with Netflix for subscribers to share their viewing history, 
should they opt-in. Meanwhile, Netflix has had a strong Twitter presence, especially in 
regards to Originals and connecting subscribers and fans directly to the cast and crew. For 
Orange is the New Black, Netflix has hosted #AskOrange on several occasions, a 
question-and-answer session between the cast and fans of the show on Twitter. Netflix 
also developed an app completely apart from its platform, Orange Is The New App, for 
fans of the show to create fan art and edit their photos, virtually joining their favorite 
Litchfield inmates. “Our Netflix brand advertising continues to resonate with consumers, 
highlighting the fun ways people’s lives are enriched when they watch something 
great” (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). After recognizing the strength that Netflix Originals 
contributed to the overall brand over the last year, it was determined that they “represent 
a tremendous opportunity to raise awareness… and build customer enthusiasm” marking 
a shift in direct-response advertising pushing the free month trial period to marketing 
their exclusive content (Netflix, Inc., April 2014). Internationally, Netflix is pushing 
campaigns to make connections to local consumers gain subscribers and win moments of 
truth.  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“Winning more moments of truth” 
 Hastings defines a “moment of truth” as when a subscriber faces the decision of 
how to spend his or her free time. His hope is that he or she ultimately finds watching a 
film or TV show on Netflix to be the most enjoyable activity, and turns to the service for 
their entertainment (Hastings, April 2014). A lot of trust is placed into Netflix’s 
personalization engine for subscribers’ preferences and viewing history to be recorded 
and offer suggestions of what to watch next on Netflix, as opposed to needless surfing 
through a channel guide or programming grid through a cable or satellite television 
provider that in Netflix’s view, is a waste of time. From the time a subscriber opens 
Netflix on their respective device, they see a “personalized ranking of what…will be the 
most relevant content for that specific member” (Hastings, April 2014). Netflix uses an 
analysis of data that includes keeping track of clicks, views, repeat views, early 
abandons, page views, and other data within their platform. The company also aims to 
fine tune their algorithm “to generate higher satisfaction, viewing and 
retention” (Hastings, April 2014). Hastings has pledged to invest over $400 million in 
2014 on further developing Netflix’s technologies to improve its overall service and 
support across the extensive range of devices that the Netflix platform operates on. 

 All that aside, Netflix is still very tight-lipped on how their algorithm and 
platform actually work. Netflix has not shared any detailed information on their metrics 
other than the optimism and faith that they have placed in it. There is a science to the 
company’s operation and despite the silence on their proprietary information, there is 
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some insight available from Netflix’s own engineers that will help subscribers and even 
competitors learn how they have the upper hand over the increasingly archaic Nielsen 
ratings system that broadcast and cable networks are still relying on. The company argues 
that because it does not sell advertising, it sees no reason to share viewership data, 
especially in regards to original programming: “…There’s no real reason…to engage 
Nielsen and report…ratings to other folks” (Sarandos, 2014). Engineering Director 
Xavier Amatrian spoke to Wired magazine on what data is used to keep track of 
subscribers’ viewing, regardless of the device being used to access the service: “We know 
what you played, searched for, or rated, as well as the time, date, and device. We even 
track user interactions such as browsing or scrolling behavior. All that data is fed into 
several algorithms, each optimized for a different purpose. In a broad sense, most of our 
algorithms are based on the assumption that similar viewing patterns represent similar 
user tastes. We can use the behavior of similar users to infer your preferences… We have 
been working for some time on introducing context into recommendations. We have data 
that suggests there is different viewing behavior depending on the day of the week, the 
time of day, the device, and sometimes even the location. But implementing contextual 
recommendations has practical challenges that we are currently working on. We hope to 
be using it in the near future.” (Vanderbilt, 2013). This can be further divided as 
subscribers now have the option to create up to five individual profiles per member 
account, with each of those users’ data tracked as they use the service. There are 800 
engineers working with the personalization platform. There is a team of freelancers, 
analysts to an extent, who manually tag films and TV shows within Netflix’s content 
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library. The company trains them to be objective, despite their own tastes and 
preferences. Netflix estimates that 75 percent of subscriber activity is guided by the 
personalization algorithm (Vanderbilt, 2013).  

 Alexis Madrigal of The Atlantic has taken his quest for understanding how the 
personalization algorithm works and concluded that “Netflix has meticulously analyzed 
and tagged every movie and TV show imaginable. They possess a stockpile of data about 
Hollywood entertainment that is absolutely unprecedented” (2014). The company’s 
deconstruction of Hollywood involved using teams of taggers trained to watch the 
content and tag them with metadata. Movies and TV shows are rated in terms of sexual 
content, gore, romance, and “even narrative elements like plot 
conclusiveness” (Madrigal, 2014). Netflix’s goal is to obtain and retain subscribers, and 
the better that the service can show that it knows the member, the more likely he or she 
will commit to their subscription. Additionally, Netflix’s data has furthered their 
advantages as a content producer: “The data can't tell them how to make a TV show, but 
it can tell them what they should be making. When they create a show like House of 
Cards, they aren't guessing at what people want” (Madrigal, 2014). Using a program 
called UBot Studio, Madrigal ran a script and discovered that Netflix’s genres would 
form out of this hierarchy of details: 
• “Region + Adjective[s] + Noun Genre + Based On… + Set In… + From the… + 
About… + For Age X to Y” 
• [and notwithstanding, random categories like “With a Strong Female Lead”] (2014) 
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 The script churned out 76,897 “altgenres”, a term that Netflix uses internally to 
mean personalized genres. Another program was used, AntConc, used in linguistics to 
turn text into data. The question left to answer was “What algorithm converted this mass 
of tags into precisely 76,897 genres?” (Madrigal, 2014). Todd Yellin, Netflix’s VP of 
Product who created the system of tagging films and TV shows, met with Madrigal, 
curious about his findings as someone with no internal access to Netflix but still able to 
compile this data. In 2006, he developed “Netflix Quantum Theory”, a document that 
tagged dozens of film and TV show details on a scale, including plots, character 
occupations, and production locations. Madrigal and Yellin related this to Pandora’s 
Music Genome Project but it was so much more “foregrounded… It's not just that Netflix 
can show you things you might like, but that it can tell you what kinds of things those 
are,” a more introspective insight (2014). Yellin’s model was more limited: the UI only 
wanted to display 50 characters of the microgenre, there needed to be a “critical mass” of 
content to match micro genre descriptions, and the microgenres had to make “syntactic 
sense” (Madrigal, 2014). One additional detail was shared regarding the system: “the 
underlying tagging data isn't just used to create genres, but also to increase the level of 
personalization in all the movies a user is shown” (Madrigal, 2014). Where Netflix could 
have just went with mere computation for its personalization algorithm, the combination 
of human and computer intelligence makes the company’s power and trust in their system 
so much more impressive. It harkens back to Netflix’s roots as a tech company with the 
computer science, mathematics, statistics, and psychology involved in its content 
delivery.  
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 “You don’t have to have a reservation, an appointment. It’s at your whims. That is 
what society has become today. We want it when we want it, all of it, now. I’m paying for 
that program. Let me choose how I want it” - Taylor Schilling, star of Orange is the New 
Black (Bloom, 2014).  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“Content people love” 
 Because Netflix doesn’t rely on archaic Nielsen and Rentrak numbers, the 
company instead harnesses the power of the Internet as well as their recommendation 
algorithms to determine what films and television series to acquire for their library. 
Hastings says that $3 billion will be spent on content for FY 2014; however, he does not 
specify whether or not this figure includes original content spending (April 2014).  

 Netflix’s strategy in content acquisition apart from its original programming, is to 
“license content from multiple suppliers, mirroring the fragmentation of the content 
industry” in each market, and actively curate the service though the data collected from 
its subscribers’ viewing habits and recommendations (Hastings, April 2014). The focus is 
on quality over quantity and the library aims to have the best in film and television in 
each category and genre. An additional strategy, according to Vice President of Content 
Acquisition Kelly Merryman, is to assess the popularity of particular films and television 
series on piracy services over the Internet like BitTorrent: “With the purchase of series, 
we look at what does well on piracy sites,” noting that FOX’s Prison Break was licensed 
to Netflix in the Netherlands when the service launched there in 2013 for that same 
reason (Schellevis, 2013).  

 Netflix has become a lot more aggressive in 2014 for streaming deals exclusive to 
its network, especially for current broadcast programming. The company paid $2 million 
per episode for the rights to Sony Pictures TV’s The Blacklist, currently airing on NBC 
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(Kastrenakes, 2014). Days later, Netflix obtained the streaming rights for Gotham, a 
Batman prequel series from Warner Bros. Television and will air on FOX starting 
September 22 (Miller, 2014). This is direct hit to ad-based Internet TV network Hulu, 
owned in part by NBC and FOX, and taking away from its potential share of next-day 
programming and the ad revenue to come with it. 

 On August 20, 2013, Netflix announced one of the largest output deals, securing 
the first-run rights of a studio's production output, to take away from premium cable for 
distribution via their streaming platform. The company reached an agreement with 
Weinstein Co. LLC to begin in 2016 to make their theatrical-release films available on 
the service (SNL Kagan, December 2013). “Weinstein is currently under agreement at 
Showtime, and the passage will leave the network with just DreamWorks Studios, IFC 
Films, and CBS movies come 2016” since they did not renew studio output deals with 
Paramount, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer [MGM], and Lions Gate in 2008, leading to the 2009 
launch of the EPIX premium network, and Summit Entertainment was lost to HBO 
starting with films releasing in 2013 (SNL Kagan, December 2013). 

 Meanwhile, EPIX, shared between Viacom, Inc. [parent company of Paramount], 
MGM, and Lions Gate, found an alternative in carriage via a subscription online deal 
with Netflix in 2010 worth an estimated $800 million (SNL Kagan, December 2013). It 
was not the first of its kind; Starz was the first premium network to make a deal with 
Netflix in 2008, worth $100 million over 3.5 years. The deal with EPIX led to a quick 
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turnaround in profitability, thanks to the Netflix deal contributing to about half of their 
revenues. 

 Netflix’s biggest deal to date in content acquisition is the programming agreement 
it entered into with Walt Disney Co. Studios in December 2012. “Netflix had to float an 
irresistible offer to Disney for the company to take a chance on a pure [OTT] distributor. 
Some reports estimate that Netflix could be paying $300 million to $400 million per 
year” (SNL Kagan, December 2013). Starz still has a deal in place with Disney for films 
released through the end of 2015, and will potentially include The Avengers: Age of 
Ultron, and the first film in the new Star Wars trilogy. Come 2016, Netflix will see 
exclusive access to the third Avengers film, the second and third film in the new Star 
Wars series, and Finding Dory, Disney and Pixar’s much-awaited sequel to 2003’s 
Finding Nemo. In a separate arrangement, Netflix has access to older films in Disney’s 
catalog, including Pocahontas, Mulan, and Alice in Wonderland. This could very well be 
a deal to secure subscriber growth over the next few years thanks to the output of 
franchise films and family-friendly content. “The deal plants the company firmly in 
competition with cable pay TV channels…something Netflix has said in the past was a 
target (SNL Kagan, December 2013).  
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Table A: List of Current and Future Output Deals Exclusive to Netflix 
Netflix-Exclusive Output Deals
Studio Films Released Through Notes
Relativity December 31, 2015
DreamWorks Animation December 31, 2015
Walt Disney December 31, 2018 • Currently with Starz, for 
films released through 
December 31, 2015 
• Starts with films released 
in 2016
The Weinstein Company December 31, 2018 • Currently with 
Showtime; for films 
released through 
December 31, 2015 
• Starts with films released 
in 2016
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“Original content” 
 The success of Netflix’s original programming starts with the economic structure 
of its content production. Despite the production costs being “cash-intensive” and “front 
loaded relative to the P&L [profit and loss]”, the company stands behind its commitment 
to originals (Hastings, April 2014). Netflix “will raise capital as needed to fund the 
growth of original content” as it continues to learn more of what its subscribers want 
“with a large opportunity to promote…original content…one that’s effectively unlimited 
in duration” (Hastings, April 2014). 

 One major advantage that Netflix has over traditional broadcast and cable original 
programming is that shows are not in competition for prime-time slots, a scarce 
commodity in linear television. Because of the freedom that the audience has in whether 
or not or how much of an original series, or any series for that matter, Netflix is willing to 
wait for a show to find its audience. The company trusts the numbers and data that it has 
on every subscriber in determining whether or not to go all-in on attaching the brand to a 
television-format series as a Netflix Original. On the development of House of Cards, 
Kevin Spacey spoke to how Netflix responded to the series pitch, relative to other 
networks interested in the project: “It wasn’t out of arrogance that David Fincher, Beau 
Willimon, and I were not interested in having to audition the idea; it was that we wanted 
to start to tell a story that would take a long time to tell. We were creating a sophisticated, 
multi-layered story with complex characters who would reveal themselves over time and 
relationships that would take space to play out… Netflix was the only network that said, 
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‘We believe in you. We’ve run our data and it tells us that our audience would watch this 
series. We don’t need you to do a pilot. How many episodes do you want to do?’ And we 
said… ‘Two seasons?’” (2013). 

 On the side of creative producers, the broadcast and cable-definitive rules for 
what television is are out the window. Run times vary; for example, where all episodes in 
the second season of Orange is the New Black ran at about 50-60 minutes per episode, 
the last one was stretched to 90 minutes. The number of episodes per season vary; for 
example, Hemlock Grove’s first season has 13 episodes and the second season has 10 
episodes. There are no recaps or cliffhangers to include. No concessions have to be made 
to allocate for commercials. “Increasingly, show creators can work without executives’ 
notes, focus groups, concerns about ratings, and anxieties about whether advertisers will 
resist having their products slotted after a nude scene or one laced with 
obscenity” (Auletta). Scott Meslow has noted that Netflix Originals have the potential to 
deviate further from conventional television: “Someone could create a show where one 
episode is 75 minutes long, and the next episode is 15 minutes long. Someone could 
decide to release one episode every week, or every month, or every holiday - or at 
random, turning every new installment into a welcome surprise. Someone could release 
every episode of a series but the finale, then hold that finale back for six months - turning 
its premiere into a buzzy event that will simultaneously be shared by all of its viewers… 
Netflix has thrived, in part, by embracing what separates its service from conventional 
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television. If they keep pushing those boundaries - in a way that their conventional rivals 
never could - who knows what kinds of stories could emerge?” (2014).  

 For the launch of Orange is the New Black, Netflix invited the Associated Press to 
its headquarters to observe the technical preparations leading to the release as one of its 
Originals (Liedtke, 2013). At midnight Pacific Standard Time on July 11, 2013, all 13 
episodes were available. “The mission is to ensure each installment…has been properly 
coded so the series can be watched on any of the 800 Internet-connected devices 
compatible… It’s a complex task because Netflix has to account for viewers who have 
different Internet connection speeds, various screen sizes and different technologies 
running the devices” (Liedtke, 2013). 120 variations of code were programmed into the 
series for it to be streamed in every Netflix-available region, and additional engineers 
were on-hand to account for foreign-language subtitles and dubbing for international 
users. The company must go through these steps for its original programming where the 
work is already done for them in the case of licensed content. “The stakes and 
anticipation surrounding Netflix’s original series are much higher than with non-original 
programming…” (Liedtke, 2013).  

 On the sustainability of Netflix Originals and the company’s extension of their 
core competency into developing their own programming, Chief Content Officer Ted 
Sarandos spoke on the shows’ impact, namely of House of Cards and Orange is the New 
Black, after both series’ second seasons released in 2014: “…It would have taken several 
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years to get to the level of original programming that we’ve achieved in our first year, 
both in terms of size of the audience; to the critical reception of the shows; to the 
importance that they’ve played in the culture” (2014). The appeal of the shows combined 
with the member data used in their development and Netflix’s strategy of releasing entire 
seasons at once, across domestic and international locales, available for viewing on any 
device is a transformative experience for audiences where programming within the 
traditional television ecosystem, broadcast and cable networks alike, operated at the 
whims of Nielsen ratings, dependent on appeasing advertisers over consumers. 

 Table B is a listing of the series that Netflix has in production and will distribute 
in its first run. This information was derived from their Q2 2014 letter to shareholders 
and further details were taken from each series’ respective IMDb page. There was little 
mention of their one-off specials, with the exception of Chelsea Handler’s Uganda Be 
Kidding Me special coming in October and additional docu-series specials leading up to 
her new show on the network coming in 2016. Additionally, there was no mention of the 
following announced Originals in the quarterly statement:  
• Hemlock Grove’s third/final season [cancellation announced September 2, 2014 
(Travers, September 2014)] 
• Lilyhammer’s third season 
• BoJack Horseman [first season released August 22, 2014 and second season 
announced August 26, 2014 (Travers, August 2014)] 
• Arrested Development’s fifth season [CCO Ted Sarandos is “positive” it will go into 
production: “It’s just a matter of when,” (Welch, 2014)] 
• The Crown [announced May 22, 2014 (Plunkett, 2014)] 
• The Magic School Bus 360 [announced June 11, 2014 (Fingas, 2014)] 
• Marseille [announced August 28, 2014 (Solsman, 2014)] 
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• DreamWorks series Turbo FAST [additional 5 episodes to fit the 26-episode order], 
King Julien, Puss in Boots, Veggie Tales in the House, [announced March 13, 2014 
(Spangler, 2014)], and 
• Marvel series Jessica Jones, Luke Cage, Iron Fist leading up to their Defenders special   
with the currently in-production Daredevil [announced November 7, 2013 
(Kastrenakes, 2013)] 
 It can be assumed that Netflix has not actively added these series to their slate 
through Q3 2014 at minimum, but it does have the talent and the hype surrounding them, 
especially the franchise projects, when it comes time to enter actual production. 
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Table B: Original Programming, Series in Production as of September 1, 2014 with 
Netflix as First-Run Distributor
Netflix Original Series, Outlined from Q2 2014 Letter to Shareholders
Program Name Release 
Date
Production 
Company
Key Personnel Production 
Status
Marco Polo December 
12, 2014 
[10 
episodes]
The Weinstein 
Company, 
Electus
Cast: Lorenzo 
Richelmy, 
Benedict Wong  
Crew: John 
Fusco, Dave 
Erickson
Completed; 
filmed in Italy, 
Kazakhstan and 
Malaysia; 
originally 
produced for 
Starz
House of Cards 
[Season 3]
Q1 2015 Media Rights 
Capital, Trigger 
Street 
Productions, 
Panic Pictures
Cast: Kevin 
Spacey, Robin 
Wright 
Crew: Beau 
Willimon, David 
Fincher
Currently 
filming in 
Baltimore, MD
Orange is the 
New Black 
[Season 3]
Q2 2015 Lionsgate 
Television, 
Tilted 
Productions
Cast: Taylor 
Schilling, Laura 
Prepon 
Crew: Jenji 
Kohan
Currently 
filming in New 
York, NY
Marvel’s 
Daredevil
Q2 2015 Marvel 
Television, ABC 
Studios
Cast: Charlie 
Cox, Vincent 
D’Onofrio 
Crew: Drew 
Goddard, Steven 
S. DeKnight
Currently 
filming in New 
York, NY
Narcos TBA 2015 Gaumont 
International 
Television
Cast: Wagner 
Moura, Pedro 
Pascal 
Crew: Jose 
Padilha
Currently 
filming in 
Colombia
Sense8 TBA 2015 Studio JMS, 
Georgeville 
Television
Cast: Naveen 
Andrews, 
Alfonso Herrera 
Crew: The 
Wachowskis
Currently 
filming in San 
Francisco, CA 
and Chicago, IL
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Grace and 
Frankie
TBA 2015 Skydance 
Productions
Cast: Jane 
Fonda, Lily 
Tomlin, Martin 
Sheen, Sam 
Waterson
Currently 
filming in Los 
Angeles, CA
Untitled 
Chelsea 
Handler Talk 
Show
TBA 2016 Borderline 
Amazing 
Productions
Cast: Chelsea 
Handler
Untitled “Dark 
Family 
Thriller”
TBA KZK 
Productions, 
Sony Pictures 
Television
Cast: Kyle 
Chandler, Sissy 
Spacek 
Crew: Glenn 
Kessler, Todd 
Kessler
Currently 
filming in 
Florida Keys
Release 
Date
Production 
Company
Key Personnel Production 
Status
Program Name
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“International” 
 At the start of Q3 2014, the company announced serving “over 50 million 
members enjoying Netflix in over 40 countries” (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). Netflix offers 
streaming of film and television content in international markets and started with Canada 
in 2010. In licensing films and television series, the company’s market structure is either 
national or multinational [e.g. the Caribbean] depending on the region. This distribution 
architecture is applied to all international markets and content is licensed at prevailing 
prices (Hastings, April 2014). 

Figure 4: Map of Netflix International Streaming Service Availability and Expansion  
Key 
Red - 2008 and before 
Violet/Purple - 2010 to 2013 
Indigo - Projected by end of 2014 
Blue - 2015 and beyond
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 As of September 1, 2014, Netflix’s streaming service is available in the following 
countries and multinational regions outside of the United States: 
• Canada 
• The Caribbean, Mexico, Central, and South America 
• United Kingdom 
• Nordic countries Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland 
• The Netherlands 
 Additionally, the company is looking to expand to the following countries and 
multinational regions by the end of 2014 and beyond: 
• Germany 
• Austria 
• Switzerland 
• France 
• Belgium 
• Luxembourg 
• Australia and New Zealand [“…planning to launch…next year {2015}, according to a 
report from an Australian film industry magazine” (ONE News, 2014).] 
 Netflix ended 2013 with just under 10 million international subscribers across the 
40 countries in which their service is available. International business accounted for 21% 
of their revenues from streaming; however, the sector faced a loss of $274.3 million 
(Wallenstein, 2014). The company has been funding its international endeavors via 
domestic streaming revenues (Hastings, April 2014). Despite the losses, Netflix maintains 
that its plan “remains to run at about global break-even to fund investment in global 
expansion” (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). 

 September 2014 will see Netflix’s launch in Germany, France, Austria, 
Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. “This launch into markets with over 60 million 
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broadband households will significantly increase…European presence and raise…current 
addressable market to over 180 million broadband households, or two times the number 
of current U.S. broadband households” (Netflix, Inc., July 2014). One of the forces 
pushing Netflix to enter the German market is LoveFilm, a streaming video-on-demand 
service, acquired by Amazon in 2011 and its rebranding as Prime Instant Video this year, 
a strong first-mover play in the space where Netflix typically had that advantage 
(Wallenstein, 2014). Meanwhile in France, there is a government policy called “cultural 
exception” and would require Netflix to fund particular local productions and pay taxes 
on their business (Wells, July 2014). The company has commissioned its first French 
original series in response to this requirement, Marseille, “an eight-episode tale of power, 
corruption and redemption set against the rich backdrop of the French port city” to  
launch in 2015 (Solsman, 2014). “We want to invest in French society and in French 
content, and we want to give an avenue for French content to get out around the world… 
Think of what we’re trying to do as connecting the world, as some of the world’s best 
content brought to the world’s citizens, and that’s really motivating… And so, we 
definitely got to work with French society, and with the assumptions and beliefs that they 
have”, Hastings said in their Q2 2014 earnings’ call (Wells, July 2014).  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“Competition” 
 Netflix identifies a broad range of competitors in not only recognizing 
immediately similar Internet TV networks like Amazon Prime, Hulu, and Redbox Instant, 
but any service or activity that demand a share in its subscribers’ time and money that 
would otherwise be spend on them. In the Long-Term View, Hastings has divided them 
into “competitors-for-time” and a narrower group called “competitors-for-content” (April 
2014). 

Table C: Selected Competition for Netflix, U.S. Market 

“Competitors-for-Time” “Competitors-for-Content”
Linear cable/satellite multichannel TV Amazon Prime, Instant Video
Live events Blockbuster @Home
Multichannel on-demand video Google Play
Internet surfing HBO, HBOGo
Video games Hulu, Hulu Plus
Multichannel pay-per-view video iTunes
Video piracy Redbox Instant
Reading books, magazines, etc. Showtime, SHO Anywhere
Social media Starz, Starz Play
Theatrical releases Target Ticket
Listening to music Warner Instant
Apps Yahoo! Screen
Blu-Ray and DVD home releases YouTube
!47
 HBO is explicitly named as Netflix’s “biggest long-term competitor-for-content” 
as they bid against each other for original content (Hastings, April 2014). While the 
competition is acknowledged for its existing global reach and self-sufficient technology 
capabilities, Netflix is looking to match and exceed them in subscriber numbers and 
revenues as they continue to advance their business model as more superior for the 
Internet generation, despite HBO having made some adaptations, like their HBO Go app 
and distributing some of their older original content through Amazon Prime. HBO has 
over 114 million subscribers worldwide; well over twice as many as Netflix’s 50 million 
subscribers (Auletta). HBO is mentioned repeatedly throughout the Long-Term View, as 
Netflix aims to overtake the Time Warner-owned premium cable network by 2 or 3 times 
the number of domestic HBO subscribers in the future with more content, more viewing-
per-subscriber, a greater brand proposition, on-demand multi-platform availability, and a 
lower monthly no-commitment fee, although HBO currently has the upper hand on more 
film and TV originals, plus first-window rights on theatrical releases (Hastings, April 
2014). Where Netflix has relied on its own metrics to determine content and originals for 
its service, HBO is still largely using the seemingly archaic Nielsen ratings figures to 
determine successes [plus, to some extent, piracy trends and metrics from their HBOGO 
app]. Netflix should be paying homage to HBO, as it paved the way of the subscription-
fee model and the development of original programming as a signature of the network 
adding to its brand identity (Wu). Nonetheless, access to HBO still requires a subscription 
through a cable or satellite television provider and is not offered “unbundled” although 
the idea has been toyed with by parent company Time Warner on occasion. 
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Figure 5: Operating Revenues between Netflix and HBO, FY 1995 to FY 2013 (in $ 
billions) 
Figure 6: Domestic Subscribers, Netflix and HBO, FY 1995 to FY 2013 (in millions) 
Figure 7: Domestic Subscribers, Netflix and HBO, Forecast for FY 2014 to FY 2018 
(in millions) 
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Figure 8: Domestic Percentage Change in Subscribers, Netflix and HBO, FY 1995 to 
FY 2013 
Figure 9: Domestic Percentage Change in Subscribers, Netflix and HBO, Forecast for 
FY 2014 to FY 2018 
 
 Amazon Prime Instant Video, with its over 20 million subscribers, are also 
discussed in the Long-Term View as competitors of Netflix; however, that relationship 
seems a bit complicated. Netflix treads carefully in this identification because Amazon 
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Web Services “provides a distributed computing infrastructure platform for business 
operations,” the cloud servers that Netflix’s platform and content library functions on 
(Form 10-K 2013). Amazon Prime Instant Video began service in early 2011, to the 
company’s Prime members who pay $79 [now $99] per year for free 2-day shipping on 
goods bought from Amazon (SNL Kagan, July 2013). Prime Instant Video has expanded 
to over 7,000 movies and TV seasons, including original offerings commissioned by 
Amazon Studios with production decisions guided by its own metrics [unavailable to the 
public, much like Netflix], member votes, and reviews of whether or not to continue a 
series past its pilot episode. “Amazon reports very little information on its Amazon Prime 
program as far as members or usage rates” (SNL Kagan, July 2013). Netflix’s app is 
available on their proprietary Android-based Kindle devices, Fire TV, and the Fire Phone 
but Amazon users looking to watch House of Cards, for example, are directed to 
purchasing individual episodes from Amazon Instant Video [as a secondary distributor 
after Netflix’s first-run exclusivity], rather than streaming it through Netflix. Hastings has 
admitted to working out those kinks by the end of 2014 which will include more of 
Netflix needing to give Amazon access to its application programming interface [API] in 
order to get to their respective content library through to their voice search technology. 
Furthermore, Hastings recognized that he and most of his employees are members of 
Amazon Prime, seeing the service as complementary to Netflix: “It’s very much not a 
zero-sum game, and we’re building this ecosystem together that’s about Internet video. 
And the more players there are in Internet video, the bigger that ecosystem gets. And the 
big theme is: Internet video is taking share away from linear video. And so, we’re all 
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participating in that transformation” (Wells, April 2014). Roy Price, Director of Amazon 
Studios, shared a similarly cooperative sentiment, preferring to focus on the needs of the 
audience in ordering original programming as an Internet TV network, rather than 
becoming fixated on what competitors like Netflix and even traditional broadcast and 
cable outlets are doing: “I would say that it doesn’t really serve you too well to spend a 
lot of time thinking mainly about the competitors and what they’re doing… Right now, 
it’s a much more diverse ecosystem, and if you just focused on one or two…competing 
sources of content - I don’t know how that could be productive. You really just have to 
focus on who’s the audience and what is the best show that we can create for them, and 
how can we make this the best show that it can possibly be” (Lynch, 2014).  

 The ad-based service Hulu and its premium subscription tier, Hulu Plus, are also 
considered competition to Netflix in the Long-Term View. Hulu, owned by News Corp., 
NBCUniversal Media, and Walt Disney Co., has access to those networks’ respective TV 
shows as soon as the day after its original airing and does not have to license its own TV 
content, saving itself from acquisition costs. Its movie selection, the other part of its 
content library, grew about 42 percent between April 2012 and April 2013, to 4,000 titles 
up from 2,800 the year before (SNL Kagan, July 2013). Paid subscribers with Hulu Plus 
were up to more than 40 million during Q1 2013. “Hulu expects subscription revenue to 
continue to outpace ad revenues, eventually accounting for more than half of overall 
revenue” as in 2012, its subscription revenue was 30 percent of its total (SNL Kagan, July 
2013). Relative to Netflix, Hulu now costs a dollar less per month at $7.99.  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“ISP relationships” 
 “We have productive relationships with most ISPs, given our joint interest in 
making broadband work well for people,” Hastings says in the section, returning Netflix 
to its DNA as a tech company (April 2014). The key word here; however, is most. Netflix 
has cooperated with ISPs domestically and internationally in allowing direct 
interconnectivity to Open Connect, their “single purpose…content delivery network” 
built and deployed themselves (Form 10-K 2013). There are fears on both ends of the 
spectrum, where either Netflix will charge ISPs for content delivery via Open Connect or 
ISPs will charge Netflix for supplying video data to broadband subscribers. This 
existential standoff has led to some ISPs like Verizon providing insufficient connectivity 
and constraining the performance of the Netflix platform to subscribers on the 
distribution end. 

 “In the long-term, we think Netflix and consumers are best served by strong 
network neutrality…across all networks, including wireless” Hastings declares at the end 
of the section (April 2014). The CEO has taken an adamant stand in the case for strong 
net neutrality and against the possibility of needing to pay Internet tolls for Netflix to 
reach subscribers in the future. In March 2014, Hastings contributed a post to the 
company’s blog in an effort to be transparent to subscribers on how net neutrality works 
and what the lack thereof would potentially mean for Netflix. In the short-term; however, 
Netflix has conceded to ISPs Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, and Time Warner Cable, paying 
for mere interconnection so that its subscribers can access their film and television 
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content. Comcast is recognized in the post as “an industry leader in supporting weak net 
neutrality” although Hastings hopes the ISP will turn a new cheek (March 2014). 

 The catalyst for Netflix to take such a firm stance on net neutrality was the D.C. 
Court of Appeals decision in January 2014 striking down the FCC’s Open Internet Order, 
designed so ISPs could not interfere with specific types of Internet data transmission 
(Etherington, 2014). Since then, Netflix has been on watch from the FCC and domestic 
ISPs for further developments on an official decision on net neutrality, particularly on 
how it affects their service reaching subscribers. The most recent 10-K filing accounts for 
this threat to Netflix’s operations: “Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia struck down the FCC’s net neutrality rules and it is currently uncertain how the 
FCC will respond to this decision. To the extent network operators attempt to use this 
ruling to extract fees from us to deliver our traffic or otherwise engage in discriminatory 
practices, our business could be adversely impacted. As we expand internationally, 
government regulation concerning the Internet, and in particular, network neutrality, may 
be nascent or non-existent” (Form 10-K 2013). 

 Netflix submitted its own comments to the FCC on the decision of net neutrality, 
to be ruled on at a later date in 2014. It is a far-reaching expansion of transparency and 
the comments that Reed Hastings made in his post to the company blog. It goes into 
further detail on the decision to “buy their way out of congestion” from Comcast, 
including making a point of the ISP refusing to deploy Open Connect for free on their 
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network: “While it had promised its customers ‘blazing fast’ Internet speeds, Comcast 
simultaneously was preventing those customers from receiving their content at the speeds 
that Comcast had promised. Comcast customers experienced this degraded network 
performance regardless of the service tier they purchased” (“Comments of Netflix, Inc. 
Before the Federal Communications Commission…”, 2014). Netflix attributes much of 
its success and advancement, including offering 4K resolution content to subscribers, to 
the strong net neutrality rules that were in place as early as 2007, when it launched its 
streaming service. Paid prioritization is another concept that Netflix is strongly against: 
“The Commission’s proposed rules arguably turn the objective of Internet openness on its 
head - allowing the Internet to look more like a closed platform, such as a cable television 
service…” (“Comments of Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal Communications 
Commission…”, 2014). Netflix also took this opportunity to address the FCC on 
implementation of rules to include three major components: 
1. “terminating ISPs cannot degrade or impede particular data sources, or charge data 
sources to avoid degradation; 
2. terminating ISPs cannot favor particular data sources, for a fee or otherwise; and 
3. terminating ISPs cannot charge data sources for interconnection and must provide 
adequate no-fee interconnection to wholesalers and Internet services so consumers 
experience the broadband speeds for which they have paid” 
(“Comments of Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal Communications Commission…”, 2014). 
 Netflix also called for more transparency in degraded Internet transmission 
speeds. ISPs should disclose in real-time the status of their network. The document also 
reminds the FCC that they distinguish the Internet in two sections: as general access, the 
transmission component regulated as a telecommunications component, and advanced 
content and application components that are not under the FCC’s regulation. Netflix 
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considers the possibility of regarding the telecommunications component of broadband as 
a separate entity, to remove those connections out of Title II of the Communications Act. 
The company suggests that it “would better reflect the service that consumers buy and 
expect from broadband providers” (“Comments of Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal 
Communications Commission…”, 2014). Should there be little to no favor on Netflix’s 
part, the company disagrees with the FCC’s paid prioritization and codification regulation 
if it were to pass: “No rule is better than a bad or ineffectual rule” (“Comments of 
Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal Communications Commission…”, 2014). 

 Netflix has also been very vocal in its opposition to the proposed merger of 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable since the deal was announced in February 2014. 
Hastings told investors, “…We’re really concerned about what happens when the 
combined entity, if the merger were to go through, would have, with over 60% of the U.S. 
homes passed, and eventually over 50% of U.S. homes subscribing to cable internet, and 
that’s a worrisome factor. So, we think it’s more in the public interest to either not have 
them merge, or, if the government goes ahead with it, to at least put some significant 
merger… statements in there” (Wells, April 2014). 

 Just as they responded to the FCC’s pending decision on net neutrality, Netflix 
submitted another document to the commission in August 2014; however, this time it was 
a 256-page-long Petition to Deny, calling on the FCC to block the merger of Comcast and 
Time Warner Cable. Similar to their comments on the net neutrality matter, Netflix 
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maintains that “Applicants” Comcast and Time Warner Cable have engaged in 
“degradation strategies” that have harmed Netflix subscribers, resulting in their need to 
pay for interconnection earlier this year (“Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc. Before the 
Federal Communications Commission…”, 2014). There are two non-mutually exclusive 
outcomes that Netflix outlines in the document. The first is a reiteration of statements 
made in their comments to the FCC on net neutrality but more specific to their dealings 
with Comcast and Time Warner Cable on interconnectivity: “The proposed merger…
would give Applicants the ability to turn a consumer's Internet experience into something 
that more closely resembles cable television. It would set up an ecosystem that calls into 
question what we to date have taken for granted: that a consumer who pays for 
connectivity to the Internet will be able to get the content she requests. The combined 
entity would have the incentive and ability-through access fees charged at interconnection 
points and by other means-to harm Internet companies, such as online video distributors 
[‘OVDs’], which Applicants view as competitors. The transaction would give Applicants 
control of a dominant share of the nation's residential high-speed broadband customers at 
a time when those customers increasingly engage with more content-rich applications 
that require high-speed broadband to work properly, such as Internet-delivered 
video” (“Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal Communications 
Commission…”, 2014). The second potential outcome speaks to the merger being a 
threat to the entire OVD business model: “…The proposed merger would significantly 
strengthen the harms to consumers and to Internet content distributors, such as OVDs. 
The business models employed by several OVDs necessarily depend on having access to 
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a ‘critical mass’ of consumers to operate profitably. Achieving and maintaining this 
critical mass allows OVDs to purchase programming and develop products more cheaply, 
but it also goes to the heart of an OVD's ability to retain subscribers and invest in new 
content. Particularly for fixed-cost OVDs the sudden loss of access to a significant 
number of customers could immediately throw the OVD into financial peril” (“Petition to 
Deny of Netflix, Inc. Before the Federal Communications Commission…”, 2014). As of 
September 1, 2014, Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc. are still awaiting 
decisions on permission from the FCC and U.S. Department of Justice on completing the 
merger.  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“Netflix margin structure and growth” 
 Hastings is very straightforward in identifying Netflix’s margin structure and 
growth to shareholders and non-investors alike in the Long-Term View. He describes its 
arrangement for domestic operations as he had already spoke of the company’s plan for 
investment in international growth in previous sections. The margin structure is set top-
down, with goals set from the company’s leadership and then cascades down to the sub-
levels. “For any given future period, we estimate revenue, and decide what we want to 
spend, and how much margin we want in that period”, the CEO shares (Hastings, April 
2014). The one variable that influences spending choices in sectors like content and 
marketing is membership growth via revenues. 

Table D: Analyst Estimates for Netflix Revenue, Projected
 
 “The market structure we have chosen is to grow content spending plus marketing 
slightly more slowly than we grow revenue”, Hastings shares, now that Netflix has a 
solid footing in its operating revenues ahead of its primary competitor HBO (April 2014). 
Future Average Third-Party Revenue Estimates for Netflix (in $ millions)
Source Q3 2014 Q4 2014 FY 2014 FY 2015
Bloomberg 
Businessweek
1400 1500 5500 6800
CNN Money 1400 1500 5500 6900
Financial 
Times
1408.56 1490.63 5508.84 6857.91
Reuters 1408.57 1490.63 5508.84 6857.91
Yahoo! 
Finance
1410 1490 5510 6860
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Another major goal is reaching a quarterly contribution margin of 30%. Since Q1 2013, 
the company saw it go from 20.6% to, most recently, 27.1% for Q2 2014 (Netflix, Inc., 
July 2014). It is projected that the quarterly contribution margin will reach 30% starting 
in 2015, and from there it will be re-evaluated for the next growth target (Hastings, April 
2014). 

 There are forces propelling and impeding Netflix’s growth at the same time. The 
company’s growth is advanced thanks to the strength of its service, content, marketing 
improvements, and technological improvements in Internet networks and the devices on 
which the platform may serve. Growth is impeded; however, by market saturation and 
“the broad set of competitors-for-time all improving their offerings” (Hastings, April 
2014). Relative to HBO’s margin structure and growth, Netflix reverts back to a model 
that was identified in 2011, where the company sees itself growing to become “2 to 3 
times larger than domestic HBO” as long as it maintains an annual domestic subscriber 
growth of 5 or 6 million members (Wells, April 2014). Its content offerings, original and 
licensed alike, and service will strive for improvement continuously.  
!60
Conclusion 
 “Netflix did it right and focused on all of the things that have replaced the dumb, 
raw numbers of Nielsen world - they embraced targeted marketing and ‘brand’ as a virtue 
higher than ratings” (Spacey). 

 Ken Auletta of The New Yorker identified two threats to television in his “Outside 
the Box” feature on Netflix. The first is the advertising model that broadcast and cable 
television has relied on since the inception of the industry. Everyone who uses a DVR to 
skip the ads or switches to Netflix or some other ad-free content service is accountable to 
a shift in advertising expenditures amounting to $18 billion towards digital media and 
away from linear TV. The second is “existential” and highlights the opportunities for 
cord-cutting and getting television content streamed over the Internet. “The future of 
television, Hastings says, is in airing more live events, which attract higher advertising 
rates” (Auletta). “Eventually… people won’t be able to imagine having their options 
defined by a programming grid” (Wu). 

 Netflix offers a viewing experience that is “more immersive and 
sustained” (Auletta). Members have the freedom to choose everything, from whether or 
not they want to commit to the service, to what they want to watch, from how they want 
to watch it, to how much of it they want to experience in one sitting. Ted Sarandos spoke 
to the amount of freedom the service offers, relative to linear TV: “Human beings like 
control… To make all of America do the same thing at the same time is enormously 
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inefficient, ridiculously expensive, and… not a very satisfying experience” (Wu). The 
future of television on Netflix’s terms lies with the company and its subscribers asking 
for the service “to just work - flawlessly” (Hastings, April 2014). 

 Netflix’s Long-Term View is Reed Hastings’ broad outlook for the company that 
he founded in 1997. The metrics related to his vision are not far from coming to fruition, 
as has been witnessed in the months immediately after the document went live on 
Netflix’s Investor Relations site. Approaching 20 years in business, he sees half of 
television content to be delivered to audiences via the Internet and is determined to keep 
his company at the forefront of it. “Netflix’s strategy - grab the market first, worry about 
profits later - is common among Internet startups…” and it is working, so long as the 
company continues to make the most informed risks, derived from its personalization 
algorithm and the data it collects from its members and their sustained usage.  

 “The risk at this juncture is becoming too institutionalized, too schematic - 
thinking that something which is working now will necessarily work a year from now. 
The curse of success is that the stakes get higher. Careers are made, salaries increase, and 
people have reputations and track records to protect. The end result is a shift towards 
conservatism, away from risk-taking. And if there is one thing that overlaps between 
business and art, it’s that in the long run, the risk-takers are rewarded” (Spacey).  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Appendix 
Forecasts for Netflix, Inc. 
• Forecasted data that used this model is included in graphs and figures with an asterisk 
(*) in the legend 
• Netflix does not provide these metrics outside of their financial statements, so they 
must be inferred from historical data 
Calculations for Netflix Subscriber Projections
Year Total Domestic 
Subscribers
Source 
[Historical] 
OR 
Calculation 
[Projected]
Year-to-Year 
Percentage 
Change
Calculation
2006 6,316,000 Netflix 2009 
Annual Report 
[includes 
domestic 
streaming and 
domestic DVD 
subscribers]
2007 7,479,000 Netflix 2009 
Annual Report 
[includes 
domestic 
streaming and 
domestic DVD 
subscribers]
18.41% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2007−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2006)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2006”
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2008 9,390,000 Netflix 2009 
Annual Report 
[includes 
domestic 
streaming and 
domestic DVD 
subscribers]
25.55% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2008−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2007)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2007”
2009 12,268,000 Netflix 2009 
Annual Report 
[includes 
domestic 
streaming and 
domestic DVD 
subscribers]
30.65% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2009−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2008)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2008”
2010 22,800,000 Q1 2011 Letter 
to Shareholders, 
“Domestic 
Subscribers” 
[includes 
domestic 
streaming and 
domestic DVD 
subscribers]
85.85% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2010−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2009)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2009”
Total Domestic 
Subscribers
Source 
[Historical] 
OR 
Calculation 
[Projected]
Year-to-Year 
Percentage 
Change
CalculationYear
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2011 23,410,000 Q1 2012 Letter 
to Shareholders, 
“Total 
Members, 
Domestic 
Streaming”
2.68% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2011−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2010)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2010”
2012 29,174,000 Q1 2013 Letter 
to Shareholders, 
“Total 
Members, 
Domestic 
Streaming”
24.62% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2012−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2011)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2011”
2013 35,674,000 Q1 2014 Letter 
to Shareholders, 
“Total 
Members, 
Domestic 
Streaming”
22.28% "=(Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2013−Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2012)÷Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2012”
Total Domestic 
Subscribers
Source 
[Historical] 
OR 
Calculation 
[Projected]
Year-to-Year 
Percentage 
Change
CalculationYear
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2014 45,534,747 "=Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2013×(1+'Year-
to-Year 
Percentage 
Change' 2014)"
27.64% "FORECAST(
A2,Netflix 
Historical 
Data::C3:C9,Ne
tflix Historical 
Data::B3:B9)
2015 58,831,713 "=Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2014×(1+'Year-
to-Year 
Percentage 
Change' 2015)"
29.2% "FORECAST(
A2,Netflix 
Historical 
Data::C3:C10,
Netflix 
Historical 
Data::B3:B10)
2016 76,201,979 "=Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2015×(1+'Year-
to-Year 
Percentage 
Change' 2016)"
29.53% "FORECAST(
A2,Netflix 
Historical 
Data::C3:C11,N
etflix Historical 
Data::B3:B11)
2017 98,759,050 "=Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2016×(1+'Year-
to-Year 
Percentage 
Change' 2017)"
29.6% "FORECAST(
A2,Netflix 
Historical 
Data::C3:C12,
Netflix 
Historical 
Data::B3:B12)
Total Domestic 
Subscribers
Source 
[Historical] 
OR 
Calculation 
[Projected]
Year-to-Year 
Percentage 
Change
CalculationYear
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2018 128,014,734 "=Total 
Domestic 
Subscribers 
2017×(1+'Year-
to-Year 
Percentage 
Change' 2018)"
29.62% "FORECAST(
A2,Netflix 
Historical 
Data::C3:C13,
Netflix 
Historical 
Data::B3:B13)
Total Domestic 
Subscribers
Source 
[Historical] 
OR 
Calculation 
[Projected]
Year-to-Year 
Percentage 
Change
CalculationYear

